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The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) is an 
organisation of 20 African states established in 1994, replacing the previous 
Preferential Trade Area between the members.1 Since its inception 
COMESA has taken an active role in the economic integration of its 
members. In 2000 the COMESA Free Trade Area was established.2
                                                 
* Paper presented at the 4th International Arbitration & ADR in Africa Workshop, 29 - 31 
July 2008, Cairo. 
 On 22 
and 23 of May 2007 the twelfth Summit of COMESA Authority of Heads of 
State and Government, held in Nairobi, Kenya, adopted the Investment 
Agreement for the COMESA Common Investment Area (CCIA 
** Professor of International Commercial Law, School of Law, SOAS, University of 
London; 
eMail: <pm29@soas.ac.uk>. 
1 COMESA member States are: Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo (DR 
Congo), Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The Founding 
Treaty can be accessed at 
http://www.comesa.int/comesa%20treaty/comesa%20treaty/Multi-language_content.2005-
07-01.3414/en  
2 See COMESA Secretariat COMESA in Brief  (Lusaka, 3rd ed April 2007) at para.7. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1698209
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Agreement).3 According to COMESA, “the CCIA Agreement is a precious 
investment tool whereby the COMESA Secretariat contemplates to create a 
stable region and good investment environment, promote cross border 
investments and protect investment, and thus enhance COMESAs 
attractiveness and competitiveness within COMESA Region, as a 
destination for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and in which domestic 
investments are encouraged.”4 Among the key pillars of the Agreement is 
the, “settlement of investment disputes through negotiations and arbitration 
mechanism.”5
 
 It is the purpose of this paper to examine the new CCIA 
Agreement and the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism that this 
treaty has put in place. It will do so not only through an examination of 
procedural structures, but also by considering the interaction between these 
and the substantive claims that can be brought by an investor under the 
Agreement.  
The paper will do so in three stages. First, so as to set the scene, the wider 
contemporary debate on the problems of investor-state dispute settlement, 
and their proposed solutions, will be examined so as to explain the 
background against which the dispute settlement provisions of the CCIA 
Agreement were finalised. It is clear from the face of these provisions that 
they seek to offer a new approach to investor-state dispute settlement which 
takes into account the types of problems that will be outlined below. Indeed 
it is fair to say that the CCIA Agreement is a significant new model for 
these purposes, in that it proposes an approach that is sensitive to the 
realities of developing states and of the particular conditions that influence 
approaches to international commercial arbitration in Africa. Given that the 
majority of International Investment Agreements (IIAs) are based on 
                                                 
3 CCIA Agreement available at 
http://www.comesa.int/investment/regimes/investment_area/Folder.2007-11-
06.4315/Multi-language_content.2007-11-07.1023/en  
4 COMESA “Investment Agreement for the CCIA: Legal tool for increasing investment 
flows within the COMESA” (2007) available at 
http://www.comesa.int/investment/regimes/investment_area/Folder.2007-11-
06.4315/Multi-language_content.2007-11-06.5437/en  
5 Ibid. 
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developed country or developed regional models, this requires that serious 
attention is paid to the CCIA Agreement in the wider investment law 
community. It offers an alternative formulation and points to how future 
generations of IIAs might be drawn up so as to provide, in the words of the 
Agreement, “investors with certain rights in the conduct of their business 
within an overall balance of rights and obligations between investors and 
Member States.”6
 
 The second part of the paper will offer a detailed analysis 
of the investor-state dispute settlement procedures in the CCIA Agreement. 
The third part will then consider the types of claims that an investor can 
make under the Agreement. There are numerous innovations in the 
substantive provisions of the Agreement that will have a significant effect 
on the subject matter of possible claims and thus on their admissibility 
before a tribunal whose jurisdiction is based on the Agreement. 
(1) Current Issues in Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
 
The main feature of investor-state dispute settlement under IIAs has been 
the rapid rise of litigation during the first years of the 21st century. 
According to the most recent UNCTAD figures, in 2007, at least 35 new 
investor-State cases were filed, 27 of which were filed with the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). The total cumulative 
number of known treaty-based cases has now reached 290. These disputes 
were filed with ICSID (or the ICSID Additional Facility) (182), under the 
arbitration rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law (UNCITRAL) (80), the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (14), the 
International Chamber of Commerce (5), and ad  hoc arbitration (5). One 
further case was filed with the Cairo Regional Centre for International 
Commercial Arbitration, one was administered by the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration and for two cases the exact venue was unknown to UNCTAD.7
                                                 
6 CCIA Agreement above n.3 Article 11. 
 
7 UNCTAD IIA MONITOR No. 1 (2008) International investment agreements: Latest 
developments in  
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Much of this increase can be attributed to the bringing of over 30 cases 
against Argentina in the aftermath of its financial crisis in 2001/2002, and in 
the extension of the ICSID Additional Facility Rules to NAFTA 
arbitrations.8 Equally the fact that a very large number of IIAs, mostly 
Bilateral Investment Agreements (BITs), have been concluded since the 
1980s (current UNCTAD estimates place the number of concluded BITs at 
2,573 at the end of 20069
 
) has created more opportunities for investors to 
bring treaty-based claims. Furthermore, investors are beginning to 
understand the value of treaty claims in situations where they feel they have 
no effective local legal or other remedies to settle their differences with the 
host country. This is in part due to the rise of specialist international 
investment lawyers and their entrepreneurship in seeking out clients who 
could bring IIA based claims. Whatever the actual reasons may be, a sharp 
rise in investment treaty-based litigation has caused a number of concerns 
that are central to the development of dispute settlement procedures and 
remedies in this area. 
On the part of investors, the foremost concern is whether dispute settlement 
provisions in IIAs are truly effective in protecting their rights and interests. 
While claims can be brought awards are often far lower than the sum 
claimed. For example in the case of TECMED v Mexico, in its award 
rendered in May 2003, the tribunal found the governmental measure at issue 
to violate the full protection and security standard and to be expropriatory. 
The compensation ($5.5 million) awarded was far below the amount 
                                                                                                                            
investor-State dispute Settlement UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIA/2008/3 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiia20083_en.pdf  at 1-2. 
8 On the Argentine cases see Carlos E.Alfaro and Pedro M Lorenti “The Growing 
Opposition of Argentina to ICSID Arbitral Tribunals: A Conflict between International and 
Domestic Law?” 6 JWIT 417 (2005). On NAFTA arbitrations see further 
www.naftaclaims.com and for critical background see IISD/WWF Private Rights, Public 
Problems A Guide to NAFTA’s Controversial Chapter on Investor Rights (Winnipeg, IISD 
2001).  
9 UNCTAD IIA MONITOR No. 3 (2007) Recent developments in international investment 
agreements 
(2006 – June 2007) UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIA/2007/6 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webiteiia20076_en.pdf  at 2 
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claimed which was $52 million.10 Equally in the recent awards against 
Argentina under the US-Argentina BIT of 1991 the tribunals that found 
against Argentina nonetheless held that their award of damages would take 
account of the reality of the economic crisis that Argentina was facing.11 
Thus investor’s claims will be considered in the full context of the 
surrounding circumstances. As one tribunal has put it, BITs “are not 
insurance policies against bad business judgments”.12
 
      
On the part of host countries, concerns have been expressed, first, as to the 
risk of large awards being made against them. For example in the case of 
CME v Czech Republic, an award of some $350 million was made. This raised 
serious concerns about the legitimacy of such large awards. However, given 
the fact that most awards fall significantly below the amount claimed this 
award may be somewhat out of line with mainstream practice.13 On the other 
hand, should the Argentine cases go against the host country it has been 
estimated that Argentina would face a compensation bill of some $80 billion.14
                                                 
10 Tecmed v Mexico ICSID Case No Arb (AF)/00/2 Award of 29 May 2003, 43 ILM 133 
(2004) 
  
11 Thus in Sempra Energy International v Argentine Republic ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16 
Award 28 September 2007 at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/SempraAward.pdf the 
tribunal stated: “The Tribunal does not believe that the issue here is one of lowering the 
standards of protection set under the Treaty or the law. This being said, however, the 
manner in which the law has to be applied cannot ignore the realities resulting from a crisis 
situation, including how a crisis affects the normal functioning of any given society.  This is 
the measure of justice that the Tribunal is bound to respect.  The Tribunal will accordingly 
take into account the crisis conditions affecting Argentina when determining the 
compensation due for the liability found in connection with the breach of the Treaty 
standards Award.” (at para. 397).  See also CMS Gas Transmission Co v Argentina ICSID 
Case No ARB/01/8 Award of 12 May 2005, 44 ILM 1205 (2005) at paras.165-166, 240: 
“[the] reality of the crisis … cannot be ignored … facts do not eliminate compliance with 
the law but do have a perceptible influence on the manner in which the law can be applied.” 
12 Maffezini v Spain Case No. ARB/97/7 award of 13 November 2000: 16 ICSID Rev-FILJ 
248 (2001) at para.64.  
13 CME v Czech Republic award of 13 September 2001 and the parallel London award of 
Lauder v Czech Republic, of 3 September 2001, can be accessed at http://www.cetv-
net.com . The Stockholm award was challenged by the Czech Republic before the Svea 
Court of Appeals in Czech Republic v CME Czech Republic BV. The Court of Appeals 
turned down the Czech challenge and upheld the award, including the approach taken to the 
calculation of damages based on the market value principle: SVEA Court of Appeals 
Judgment of 15 May 2003: 42 ILM 919 (2003) see too the Introductory Comment by 
Thomas Waelde:  42 ILM 915 (2003).       
14 See William W. Burke-White and Andreas von Staden “Investment Protection in 
Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluded Measures 
Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties” 48 Va.Jo.Int’l.L. 307 (2008) at 311. 
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It is hard to see how such a sum could ever be paid by a host country. The 
social implications of such a pay out could be disastrous and would lead to 
complex negotiations about debt financing and reconstruction, as no other 
routes would exist for such sums to be found. 
 
A second concern for host states is that international arbitral tribunals lack the 
legitimacy of a court of law and so they ought not to have the responsibility to 
pronounce upon the legality or otherwise of governmental action. Indeed their 
power to do so may result in an illegitimate interference with the host 
country’s right to regulate and could lead to “regulatory chill” in that host 
country authorities would make decisions not based so much on the wider 
public interest but with a view to avoiding liability to investors under an 
applicable IIA.15
 
 In some cases this could lead to decisions that favour investor 
rights over other equally important, if not superior, claims upon the regulatory 
obligations of public authorities. 
A third major concern for host countries is the risk that particular cases will 
give rise to multiple claims from the same multinational corporate group, 
causing overstretch in resources and time devoted to defending such claims. 
This occurred in the CME litigation against the Czech Republic, where both 
the Netherlands based holding company of the entity undertaking the 
investment in the Czech Republic and the owner of the parent company both 
brought separate proceedings in separate venues arising out of the same 
facts.16 Corporate groups will not be seen as a single entity for these 
purposes.17
                                                 
15 See UNCTAD World Investment Report 2003 (New York and Geneva, United Nations, 
2003) at 111 and 145-47. 
 This raises concerns that the group as a whole might seek to use 
16 See CME v Czech Republic and Lauder v Czech Republic above n.13. See further “Who 
Wins and Who Loses in Investment Arbitration? Are Investors and Host States on a Level 
Playing Field? – The Lauder/Czech Republic Legacy” in 6 JWIT pp.59-77 (2005); Charles 
Brower and Jeremy Sharpe “Multiple and Conflicting International Arbitral Awards” 4 JWI 
211 (2003). 
17 See CMS Gas Transmission Company v Argentina ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8 decision on 
jurisdiction 17 July 2003 available at www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases or 42 ILM 788 
(2003) at para. 80. See too Azurix v Argentina ICSID Case No.ARB/01/12 decision on 
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its ability to bring multiple claims as a means of putting pressure on the host 
country to admit liability. This point was been made in relation to the 
abovementioned multiple claims against the Czech Republic.  However, in 
that proceeding, the Czech Republic decided against arguing for a 
consolidation of the claims. On the other hand, different entities in the group 
will have different interests to protect and so to assimilate these parties and 
these claims may well deprive multinational groups of important legal rights 
that ensure the proper operation of the investment.18
 
    
Other stakeholders apart from investors and host countries have also entered 
the debate on investor-state dispute settlement. In particular, certain Western 
Non Governmental organisations (NGOs) have been vocal critics of the 
procedures involved in such cases.19
                                                                                                                            
jurisdiction 8 December 2003 available at 
 Their concerns centre on the issue of 
whether all the relevant stakeholder groups, that might be affected by the 
operation of an investment and the outcome of possible litigation between the 
investor and host country, can know of that process and have a meaningful 
input into it, so as to ensure that their perspective is considered by the tribunal. 
This position challenges the legitimacy of arbitral tribunals, often composed of 
private practitioners who have no official capacity other than an appointment 
by the parties, as deciders of major public policy issues. In this the NGOs 
www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases or 43 ILM 262 
(2004) at paras.86-90.   
18 See Christoph Schreuer The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2001) at p.249. 
19 Among the most knowledgeable in the field is the Canadian based International Institute 
for Sustainable development (IIISD). See for example, IISD Publications Centre Comments 
on ICSID Discussion Paper, “Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID 
Arbitration” (Howard Mann, Aaron Cosbey, Luke Eric Peterson, Konrad von Moltke, IISD, 
2004); IISD http://www.iisd.org/publications/pub.aspx?pno=667 and Center  for 
International Environmental Law (CIEL) Revising the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules to 
Address Investor-State Arbitrations (revised version - December 2007) 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/investment_revising_uncitral_arbitration_dec.pdf . See too 
William Greider “Invalidating the 20th Century: How the right is using trade law to overturn 
American democracy” The Nation Vol.273 No.11 October 15 2001 p.21, who focuses on 
NAFTA dispute settlement in particular, displaying how much this has caused anxiety in 
North American political circles. 
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share the same concerns as host countries about regulatory chill and the 
inhibition of legitimate regulatory decisions.  
 
On a more technical level this perspective demands greater transparency in 
knowledge about the existence of arbitral proceedings, a significant number of 
which take place in secret, openness of hearings and transparency of 
documentation as well as greater accountability of arbitrators for their 
decisions. In addition rights of third parties to appear as amici curiae are 
advocated. The issue of legitimacy is further elaborated by concern over the 
impartiality of arbitrators, many of whom may act as counsel in other cases 
whose outcome can be affected by the outcome of the case in which they are 
arbitrators. This leads to demands for stricter rules on the appointment and 
eligibility of arbitrators. Finally as regards the increasing number of public 
awards that are inconsistent and confusing in their interpretation of treaty 
provisions, this position has advocated the establishment of a system of 
appellate review of awards.    
  
Such concerns led ICSID itself to consider reforms including prompt 
publication of awards where the parties exercise their right to permit such 
publication, more open procedures allowing access to proceedings for 
interested third parties and a possible ICSID appeals facility.20 Some of these 
reforms were instituted in the latest changes to the Arbitration Rules in 2006, 
allowing, in particular, for third party participation in ICSID arbitration at the 
discretion of the tribunal after the consultation of both parties.21
 
 
Given the context of the present paper some further concerns relating to the 
use of investor-state arbitration in Africa must be highlighted.22
                                                 
20 See ICSID Secretariat Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration 
(Discussion Paper, 22 October 2004); ICSID Secretariat Suggested Changes to the ICSID 
Rules and Regulations (Working Paper, 12 May 2005).    
 International 
21 See Arbitration Rules Rule 37(2) in ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules (ICSID/15, 
10 April 2006 available at www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/CRR_English_final.pdf ). 
22 See especially Amazu A. Asouzu International Commercial Arbitration and African 
States: Practice, Participation and Institutional Development (Cambridge, Cambridge 
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commercial arbitration has been viewed with some suspicion in Africa in the 
past. This is due to numerous factors. The most important are the colonialist 
roots of this system of dispute settlement.23 In particular, in colonial times, 
disputes over international trade transactions would be controlled by the 
standard terms of trade exchanges and trade associations dominated by 
colonialist business interests. These systems of arbitration were internal to 
these bodies. Accordingly, Africans were largely kept out of these bodies and 
so could not know how these systems worked. In addition, the main national 
arbitration laws of the time were based on old precedents from the 
metropolitan legal system. These laws were not replaced by new laws after 
independence resulting in obsolete procedures that did not reflect the state of 
the art in commercial arbitration.24
 
 
Further difficulties arise out of the historical lack of participation in the 
development of international commercial arbitration on the part of Africans. 
Many of the major international institutions dealing with international 
commercial arbitration were founded before the majority of African states 
had achieved independence. Thus their rules and procedures were 
determined without an African presence.25 This contributed to an essentially 
Western view of what proper arbitral procedures were and to the further 
reinforcement of limited African knowledge on the subject. In addition, after 
decolonization, the newly independent African states concentrated on issues 
of political self-determination and sovereignty, culminating in calls for a 
New International Economic Order (NIEO) in the early 1970s.26
 
 They did 
not prioritise the reformulation of international commercial law, including 
international arbitration, further entrenching the distance between this 
method of dispute settlement and African laws and practices.  
                                                                                                                            
University Press, 2001) and Samson L. Sempasa “Obstacles to International Commercial 
Arbitration in African Countries” 41 ICLQ 387 (1992).    
23 See Asouzu previous note at 416 et seq. 
24 See Sempasa above n.22 at 391. 
25 Asouzu above n.22 at 420-21; Sempasa above n.22 at 395. 
26 Sempasa ibid at 390 and 394. 
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Linked to these sovereignty concerns, newly independent African states 
expressed misgivings about the value of international commercial 
arbitration as a means of settling their commercial disputes. Given that, in 
the early post-colonial period, most economic activity was conducted by the 
state27 there was little interest in the practices and procedures of 
international commercial arbitration, a system designed to provide redress 
for disputes between private commercial parties. This situation occurred at 
the same time as the rise of foreign direct investment by multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) in African states. Such investments often involved 
major investment projects in natural resource extraction or infrastructure 
development governed by concession contracts which provided for 
delocalized international arbitration. Such procedures were seen as an 
imposition on the state by the foreign investor, who had the upper hand in 
bargaining power over the host country when the concession was given.28 
Moreover, this feeling of external imposition was exacerbated by the 
general suspicion, on the part of foreign investors, of domestic courts and 
the judiciary in the newly independent African states. Investors felt, rightly 
or wrongly, that national laws and procedures could not be trusted to deliver 
justice in countries where the state was the dominant presence in business 
and which appeared prone to authoritarian rule and widespread corruption.29 
Unfortunately, such attitudes are still commonly encountered today placing 
a break on the willingness of foreign investors to use local laws and dispute 
settlement systems and on their lawyers to advise on such a course of 
action.30
 
  
More recently, attitudes to international commercial arbitration have been 
changing in Africa. In particular, as the market-based model of economic 
development has become increasingly accepted by African states,31
                                                 
27 Asouzu above n.22 at 30. 
 the need 
28 Sempasa above n.22 at 393. 
29 See Asouzu above n.22 at 35, 37-38, 105-108 and 425. 
30 For a strong critique of this prejudice see generally Asouzu above n.22. 
31 See for example the COMESA Treaty (above n.1) Article 151 “Creation of an Enabling 
Environment for the Private Sector” and Article 152(1) “Strengthening the Private Sector”: 
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to ensure that commercial arbitration is available and is based on modern 
and effective procedural foundations has increased.32 The response has been 
to pass more modern arbitration laws, some of which are based on the 
UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law of 1985,33 to accede to the New York 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards of 
1958 (The New York Convention),34 and to the Washington Convention on 
the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other 
States 1965 (the ICSID Convention), which established ICSID.35 In addition 
regional arbitration centres have been established in Cairo and Lagos.36
 
   
Against this background, as will be shown in the next two sections, the 
CCIA Agreement represents a challenging new departure. As noted in the 
introduction to the paper, it provides a system of investor-state arbitration 
that seeks to reconcile the concerns both of investors, African host countries 
and other stakeholders in the fair and effective resolution of disputes 
through regional dispute settlement mechanisms. It offers to the investor the 
choice of international arbitration based on a balance of rights and 
obligations between them and the respondent state. In this the CCIA 
Agreement can be viewed as a significant response to the concerns of 
investors about local remedies while at the same time structuring the 
available substantive types of claim to ensure that legitimate state rights to 
regulate are not unduly curtailed and that the rights and interests of 
significant third parties are not ignored. 
 
                                                                                                                            
“The Member States shall endeavour to adopt programmes to strengthen and promote the 
role of the private sector as an effective force for the development, progress and 
reconstruction of their respective economies.” 
32 See further Dr C.J.Amasike (ed) Strengthening of Arbitration and ADR Institutions and 
Centres in Africa as a Catalyst for Foreign Investment (Arbitration and Alternative Dispute 
Resolution in Africa, Yaliam Press, Nigeria, 2007) and Dr C.J.Amasike (ed) Building a 
Contemporary and an Effective Arbitration and ADR in Africa (Arbitration and Alternative 
Dispute Resolution in Africa, The Regent (Printing and Publishing) Ltd, Nigeria, 2005). 
33 See Asouzu above n.22 ch.5. 
34 See ibid ch.6. 
35 The Washington Convention on Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and 
Nationals of Other States 1965: 4 ILM 524 (l965); 575 UNTS 159 extensively discussed in 
relation to Africa in Asouzu above n.22 Part 4.   
36 See Asouzu ibid Part 2. 
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(2) Investor-State Dispute Settlement Procedures under the CCIA 
Agreement      
 
Dispute settlement is governed by Part Three of the CCIA Agreement. Part 
Three offers two principal methods of dispute settlement: state-to-state and 
investor-state. The former does not normally extend to issues directly 
arising out of investor claims in most IIAs.37 However, the CCIA 
Agreement does allow the home state of a COMESA investor to bring a 
claim where, “the respondent has breached an obligation under [the CCIA 
Agreement], and that the claimant or its investor has incurred loss or 
damage by reason of, or arising out of, that breach.”38 The precise scope of 
this provision is unclear as regards claims brought where the investor suffers 
loss or damage. For the most part investor-state disputes will be settled 
under the investor-state provisions. It would appear that in certain cases, 
presumably those not covered by investor-state dispute settlement, a right to 
diplomatic protection of the investor is permitted. Given the rather uncertain 
nature of diplomatic protection as a device for the protection of foreign 
investors, it is unlikely that this procedure will be much used.39
 
   
Investor-state dispute settlement is open only to COMESA investors. 
According to Article 1(4) of the CCIA Agreement this includes a natural or 
juridical person of a Member State, “making an investment in another 
Member State, in accordance with the laws and regulations of the Member 
State in which the investment is made.” For the purposes of this definition 
“natural person” means a person having citizenship of a 
Member State in accordance with its applicable laws and regulations; and 
“juridical person” means, “any legal entity duly constituted or otherwise 
organised under the applicable laws and regulations of a Member State.” In 
the case of a juridical person owned or controlled by foreign nationals, this 
                                                 
37 See UNCTAD Dispute Settlement: State-State Series on issues in international 
investment agreements (New York and Geneva, United Nations, 2003).   
38 CCIA Agreement above n.3 Annex A Article (2) (1) 
39 On which see further Peter T. Muchlinski Multinational Enterprises and the Law 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2007)at 704-707. 
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shall not qualify as a COMESA investor unless, “it maintains substantial 
business activity in the Member State in which it is duly constituted or 
organised.” This requires, “an overall examination, on a case-by-case basis, 
of all the circumstances, including, inter alia: the amount of investment 
brought into the country; the number of jobs created; its effect on the local 
community; and the length of time the business has been in operation.”40 
The availability of investor-state dispute settlement is thus limited to 
investors from other COMESA Member States. Accordingly, a non-
COMESA investor would need first to establish a subsidiary, branch or 
other legally recognised form of business association in a COMESA country 
so as to benefit from this procedure. In addition the non-COMESA investor 
would have to comply with the substantial business activity requirement 
which introduces an “effective link” type of nationality test into such 
cases.41
   
  
Before either type of dispute settlement mechanism can be invoked the 
CCIA Agreement demands use of other dispute settlement techniques. Thus, 
Part Three begins with Article 26 on negotiation and mediation. According 
to Article 26 the claimant, whether a state or COMESA investor, shall issue 
a notice of intention to initiate a claim to the other potential disputing party. 
There follows a minimum six-month cooling-off period between the date of 
the notice and the date a party may formally initiate a dispute. Article 26 (3) 
asserts that, “[t]he parties shall seek to resolve potential disputes through 
amicable means, both prior to and during the cooling-off period.” In this the 
CCIA Agreement follows the extensive practice in IIAs to provide for the 
                                                 
40 CCIA Agreement above n.3 Article 4 (1). 
41 On which see the The Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v Guatemala) I.C.J. Reports 1955 p.4; 
David Harris “The Protection of Companies in International Law in the Light of the 
Nottebohm Case” 18 ICLQ 275 (1969) at 285-295. This approach to corporate nationality was 
rejected by the International Court of Justice in the Case Concerning The Barcelona Traction, 
Light and Power Company, Limited (New Application: 1962) (Belgium v Spain) Second 
Phase, Judgment of 5 February 1970, I.C.J. Reports 1970 p.3. However the ICSID Convention 
(above n.35) uses a simpler control test of corporate nationality in Article 25 (2) (b) on which 
see further Muchlinski above n.39 at 726-31.  
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use of informal dispute settlement methods in the first place.42 The CCIA 
Agreement goes on the mandate mediation where no alternative means of 
dispute settlement is agreed upon by the parties. The mediator will be 
chosen by the parties from the COMESA list of mediators, or by the 
President of the COMESA Court of Justice where the parties cannot agree. 
This procedure does not affect the minimum cooling-off period. If the 
parties accept a mediation ruling it becomes immediately binding upon 
them.43
 
 This is an innovative development in IIAs. It places Alternative 
Dispute Resolution (ADR) at the heart of the dispute settlement process. It 
also allows the parties time before they go to arbitration. In this it may 
discourage needless litigiousness, something that has become a rather 
unwelcome development under IIAs in more recent times. 
Should amicable negotiation or mediation under Article 26 fail then 
arbitration may be resorted to in accordance with the requirements of Article 
28 of the CCIA Agreement. Claims are restricted to Part Two of the 
Agreement, which deals with investor rights and obligations. Investors 
cannot bring claims based on the general obligations of Member States or 
the institutional provisions under Part One.44 A three year limitation period 
is imposed on the bringing of claims.45
 
 The investor must assert that the 
respondent state, in whose territory the investor has made an investment, has 
breached an obligation under Part Two and that the investment has incurred 
loss or damage by reason of, or arising out of, that breach.  
The investor is given the choice of a number of dispute settlement fora 
under Article 28:  
                                                 
42 See, for further examples, UNCTAD Dispute Settlement: Investor-State Series on issues 
in international investment agreements (New York and Geneva, United Nations, 2003) at 
23-26. 
43 CCIA Agreement above n.3 Article 26 (4)-(6). 
44 Ibid Article 10. 
45 By Article 28 (2) of the CCIA Agreement, “No claim shall be submitted to arbitration if 
more than three years have elapsed from the date on which the COMESA investor first 
acquired, or should have first acquired, knowledge of the breach and knowledge that the 
COMESA investor has incurred loss or damage.” 
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“(a) to the competent court of the Member State in whose territory 
the investment has been made; 
(b) to the COMESA Court of Justice in accordance with Article 
28(b) of the COMESA Treaty; or 
(c) to international arbitration: 
(i) under the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID) Convention, provided that both 
the home state of an investor and Member State in whose 
territory the investment has been made are parties to the 
ICSID Convention; 
(ii) under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, provided that 
either the non-disputing Party or the respondent is a party to 
the ICSID Convention; 
(ii) under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules; or 
(iv) under any other arbitration institution or under any other 
arbitration rules, if the both parties to the dispute agree.” 
 
This range of choice is typical of modern dispute settlement clauses in 
IIAs.46
 
 In addition Article 28 introduces what is termed “arbitration without 
privity” in that, as paragraph 4 clarifies,  
“Each Member State consents to the submission of a claim to 
arbitration under this Agreement in accordance with its provisions. 
Each investor, by virtue of establishing or continuing to operate or 
own an investment subject to this Agreement, consents to the terms 
of the submission of a claim to dispute resolution under this 
Agreement if he exercises the right to bring a claim against a 
Member State under this Agreement.” 
 
                                                 
46 See further UNCTAD above n.42 at 37-44 and see Antonio Parra “Provisions on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes in Modern Investment Laws, Bilateral Investment 
Treaties and Multilateral Instruments on Investment” 12 ICSID Rev-FILJ 287 (1997). 
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By this provision each Contracting State makes a unilateral offer of arbitration 
which is accepted by the investor when they make the choice to use one of the 
methods of arbitration listed. For example, should the investor choose ICSID 
arbitration this will amount to consent for the purposes of Article 25 of the 
ICSID Convention if the foreign investor accepts the offer by choosing ICSID 
arbitration in writing, usually by filing a claim with ICSID.47 This approach to 
consent has been termed “arbitration without privity” in that the host country 
makes an offer to all foreign investors which can be subsequently accepted by 
any investor involved in a dispute with that country, thereby obviating the 
need for a prior arbitration agreement between them.48
 
 
Article 28 makes the choice of the investor final and exclusive. By 
paragraph 3, “[i]f the COMESA investor elects to submit a claim at one of 
the fora set out in paragraph 1 of this Article, that election shall be definitive 
and the investor may not thereafter submit a claim relating to the same 
subject matter or underlying measure to other fora.” This is known as the 
“fork-in-the road” clause. Such “fork-in-the-road” clauses have been the 
subject of arbitral interpretation before ICSID.49 The key issue concerns 
whether the dispute submitted by the investor to the national courts or 
tribunals is one that invokes a claim of a breach of the applicable IIA, or 
whether it is an independent cause of action that raises no such issue.50
                                                 
47 This was accepted in the Report of the Executive Directors on the Washington Convention, 
para. 24: see 4 ILM 524 (1965) at 527. See further Schreuer above n.18 at 198-221. 
 If 
the national claim is identical to the international claim made before the 
ICSID Tribunal then the jurisdiction of the latter body has been excluded by 
the investor’s choice under the fork-in-the-road provision. However, 
questions that can only be determined under the applicable national law of 
the host country, such as whether a license has been properly refused or a 
tax properly charged, can only be considered before national courts or 
tribunals in the first instance. Such determinations do not, of themselves, 
48 See Jan Paulsson “Arbitration Without Privity” 10 ICSID Rev-FILJ 232 (1995).   
49 See the discussion in Schreuer above n.18 at 239-49. 
50 See Genin v Estonia ICSID Case No.ARB/99/2 award of 25 June 2001 available at 
www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases or 17 ICSID Rev-FILJ 395 (2002) at paras.331-3. 
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raise any issues as to the breach of an IIA. Accordingly a choice of national 
tribunal by the investor in such a case will not operate to oust ICSID 
jurisdiction where the investor subsequently brings a separate claim alleging 
breach of the CCIA Agreement.51
 
   
The reference of an issue of national law to the relevant national dispute 
settlement body should not preclude a subsequent international claim being 
brought under the treaty for an alleged violation of its protection provisions, 
on the ground that such a claim relates to the investment protected under the 
applicable treaty and is separate from the underlying national legal dispute. 
In such a case there can be no fork-in-the-road, as there is no identity of 
subject-matter in the two legal proceedings. In addition, it is not open to the 
host country to avoid its responsibility under international law by relying on 
an exclusive jurisdiction clause in a contract with the investor if the national 
claim is not one based exclusively on the investment contract but also raises 
issues as to the conformity of governmental action with the IIA.52
 
   
The remaining provisions of Article 28 introduce significant innovations 
into the arbitral procedure, which seek to respond to concerns over the lack 
of transparency and third party participation in arbitral proceedings and to 
balance the rights and obligations of investors in relation to their right to 
bring claims. On the first of these issues, Article 28 (5) to (7) introduce the 
public availability of all documents related to the arbitration and open public 
hearings on both procedural and substantive issues, both of which are 
subject, on the part of the tribunal, to such exceptional steps as are 
necessary, to protect confidential business information.53
                                                 
51 See Muchlinski above n.39 at 697 
 In addition, the 
52 See Muchlinski ibid. See further Compania de Aguas Aconquija SA and Compagnie 
Generale des Eaux (Vivendi) v Argentina ICSID Case No.ARB/97/3 award of 21 
November 2000 available at www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases or 40 ILM 426 (2001) at 
paras. 53-5 upheld by the Ad Hoc Annulment Committee in Compania des Aguas del 
Aconquija SA and Vivendi Universal (Formerly Compagnie Generale des Eaux) v 
Argentina ICSID Case ARB/97/3 decision on annulment 3 July 2002) available at 
www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases or 41 ILM 1135 (2002). at paras 38-42. 
53 CCIA Agreement above n.3. By Article 28 (5): “All documents relating to a notice of 
intention to arbitrate, the settlement of any dispute pursuant to Article 28, the initiation of 
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arbitral tribunal shall be open to the receipt of amicus curiae submissions. 
This is to be done in accordance with the process set out in Annex A in 
relation to state-to-state disputes with necessary adaptation for application to 
investor-state disputes.54
 
 
Article 8 Annex A deals with amicus curiae submissions. It is a rather 
general provision which leaves much to be determined. 55 It asserts that, 
“[t]he tribunal shall have the authority to accept and consider amicus curiae 
submissions from a person or entity that is not a disputing party (the 
“submitter”)”.56 Thus the tribunal is not bound to accept such a submission 
but has discretion over whether to do so. By paragraph 3 of Article 8, “[t]he 
CCIA Committee may establish and make available to the public a standard 
form for applying for status as amicus curiae. This may include specific 
criteria which will help guide a tribunal in determining whether to accept a 
submission in any given instance.” Therefore more detailed guidance on 
how this discretion is to be used must await the formulation of such 
guidelines, which is not mandatory given the non-binding language used in 
this paragraph.57
                                                                                                                            
an arbitral tribunal, or the pleadings, evidence and decisions in them, shall be available to 
the public.” 
 The submissions shall be provided in English, French or 
Portuguese or in the principal language of the host state. To ensure the 
identity and affiliation of the submitter the submission, “shall identify the 
submitter and any Party, other government, person, or organization, other 
than the submitter, that has provided, or will provide, any financial or other 
54 Ibid Article 28 (8). 
55 CCIA Agreement above n.3 Annex A Article 8. By para.3, “The CCIA Committee may 
establish and make available to the public a standard form for applying for status as amicus 
curiae. This may include specific criteria which will help guide a tribunal in determining 
whether to accept a submission in any given instance.” 
56 CCIA Agreement ibid Annex A Article 8.  
57 Some guidance as to what could be included in such guidelines can be obtained from 
Article 39(4) of the Canadian Model Foreign Investment Protection Agreement: “In 
determining whether to grant leave to file a non-disputing party submission, the Tribunal 
shall consider, among other things, the extent to which: (a) the non-disputing party 
submission would assist the Tribunal in the determination of a factual or legal issue related 
to the arbitration by bringing a perspective, particular knowledge or insight that is different 
from that of the disputing parties; (b) the non-disputing party submission would address a 
matter within the scope of the dispute; (c) the non-disputing party has a significant interest 
in the arbitration; and (d) there is a public interest in the subject-matter of the arbitration.” 
Available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf.    
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assistance in preparing the submission.”  Submissions may relate to any 
matter covered by the CCIA Agreement that is relevant to the claim before 
the tribunal. Again the tribunal will be the judge of what is or is not 
relevant.  
 
This provision is not a very strong assertion of amicus curiae rights given 
the high degree of discretion left to the tribunal. However, this is consistent 
with for example current practice at ICSID, where third party submissions 
will only be admitted at the discretion of the tribunal after consultation with 
both parties.58  Equally it is more detailed than other such provisions in 
other IIAs. For example Article 28 (3) the US-Rwanda BIT of 2008 simply 
states, “[t]he tribunal shall have the authority to accept and consider amicus 
curiae submissions from a person or entity that is not a disputing party.”59 
On the other hand the Canadian Model Foreign Investment Protection 
Agreement of 2004 has a detailed provision on this issue.60 While such 
provisions serve to increase transparency and stakeholder participation, they 
may also have the effect of burdening the parties to the dispute, who may be 
obliged to respond to arguments made by the amicus curiae, and to force 
parties to settle or refuse to settle based on public pressure rather than on the 
basis of the applicable legal rules.61
 
 However, this consequence may be 
required so as to ensure that investor-state disputes involving major public 
interest issues take account of those issues as well as narrow rules of law. It 
also reinforces the need to consider revising IIAs to ensure that the balance 
of rights and obligations is not geared too far in favour of investors without 
also considering the host country’s regulatory responsibilities and the effects 
of investor rights on thirds party rights.   
                                                 
58 See above n.21. 
59 US Rwanda BIT 19 February 2008 at  
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/BIT/Rwa/asset_upload_file743_14523.pdf 
60 See Canada FIPA above n.57 Article 39.  
61 See UNCTAD Investor State Dispute Settlement and Impact on Investment Rulemaking 
(New York and Geneva, United Nations, 2007) at 86-87. 
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As to the issue of balance between the rights and obligations of investors, 
Article 28 (9) contains a significant innovation in IIA practice. It states that:  
 
“A Member State against whom a claim is brought by a COMESA 
investor under this Article may assert as a defence, counterclaim, 
right of set off or other similar claim, that the COMESA investor 
bringing the claim has not fulfilled its obligations under this 
Agreement, including the obligations to comply with all applicable 
domestic measures or that it has not taken all reasonable steps to 
mitigate possible damages.”62
  
 
This provision must be read in conjunction with Article 13, which states that 
“COMESA investors and their investments shall comply with all applicable 
domestic measures of the Member State in which their investment is made.” 
It is under national law that a balancing of rights and responsibilities can be 
drawn up. Failure to observe applicable national law would take the 
investors claim outside the realm of the dispute settlement provisions of the 
CCIA Agreement. Some recent arbitral awards have considered similar 
formulations in BITs. Some BITs contain wording to the effect that the 
definition of an investment covered by the agreement is one made “in 
accordance with host state law”.63
                                                 
62 CCIA Agreement above n.3 Article 28 (9). 
 This can confirm that both foreign and 
domestic investors have to observe local law and that only those 
investments that are compliant with local law can obtain protection under 
the BIT, including any applicable laws on entry and establishment of 
foreign investment. Thus a tribunal can refuse jurisdiction over a dispute 
where the investor has acted in a fraudulent manner that renders the 
obtaining of an investment contract illegal under the law of the host state, by 
63 For example the BIT between Chile and New Zealand states that “investment” means any 
kind of asset or rights related to it, “provided that the investment has been made in 
accordance with the laws and regulations of the Contracting party receiving it…” cited in 
UNCTAD Bilateral Investment Treaties 1995-2006: Trends in Investment Rulemaking 
(New York and Geneva, United Nations, 2007) at 9. 
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reason of breaches of good faith and unjust enrichment rules.64 Equally, 
where the investor obtains a contract in knowing violation of nationality of 
ownership requirements under host state laws, this can take the dispute 
outside the protection of the BIT.65 On the other hand violations of host state 
law after the entry of the investment cannot go to jurisdiction but only to the 
merits of the claim.66
 
 
The remaining provisions of Part Three deal with enforceability of awards, 
the maintenance of a roster of COMESA arbitrators and the governing law 
in disputes. As to enforceability, the CCIA Agreement requires that, 
“Member States shall adopt such domestic rules as are required to make 
final awards enforceable in domestic legal proceedings in their states.”67 
Unlike the ICSID Convention there is no automatic recognition of awards as 
if they were decisions of a court of law.68 However, the execution of the 
ICSID award will be governed by the laws concerning the execution of 
judgments in force in the state where execution is sought.69 This includes the 
applicable law relating to a foreign state's immunity from execution.70 Thus 
the respondent state still enjoys the protection of the law of sovereign 
immunity as applied in the enforcing state.71
                                                 
64 See Inceysa Vallisoletana SL v El Salvador ICSID Case No Arb/03/26 Decision on 
Jurisdiction 2 August 2006 available at 
 In practical terms, therefore, the 
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Inceysa_Vallisoletana_en_001.pdf  See for analysis 
Christina Knahr “Investments ‘in accordance with host state law’” 4 Transnational Dispute 
Management Issue 5 September 2007 available at www.transnational-dispute-
management.com  
65 See Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v The Philippines ICSID Case No 
Arb/03/25 Award of 16 August 2007 available at 
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/FraportAward.pdf  see too Knahr ibid. 
66 Ibid at paras. 344-45. 
67 CCIA Agreement above n.3 Article 29. 
68 See ICSID Convention above n.35 Article 54. 
69 Ibid. Article 54 (3) 
70 Ibid. Article 55. 
71 See for example the US case LETCO v Government of Liberia 650 F.Supp. 73 (SDNY 
1986), 26 ILM 695 (1987) aff'd memo No.86-9047 (2d Cir, May 19, 1987). See too Georges 
Delaume "Sovereign immunity and transnational arbitration" in J. Lew (ed) Contemporary 
Problems in International Arbitration (London, Queen Mary College Centre for Commercial 
Law Studies, 1986) 313. In SOABI (SEUTIN) v Senegal (France, Cour de Cassation, 11 June, 
1991), 30 ILM 1167 (1991), it was held that a foreign state that has consented to ICSID 
arbitration has thereby agreed that the award may be granted recognition (exequatur) which, as 
such, does not constitute a measure of execution that might raise issues pertaining to the 
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enforceability of an ICSID award is subject to the overriding principle of 
protecting the property belonging to a foreign sovereign, which is used for 
sovereign rather than commercial purposes, against execution, this being the 
most commonly applicable rule found in national laws.72 By contrast the 
COMESA rule is rather in the form of a harmonisation measure which leaves 
much open to the national legislative organs. That said it is highly unlikely that 
the law of sovereign immunity could be disregarded. It is likely that the 
Member State concerned might pass a specific statute giving automatic 
recognition to the COMESA award, but subject to overriding national laws on 
the recognition of international arbitral awards. In this regard the question 
whether or not the Member State is a signatory of the New York Convention 
would be a relevant consideration. There appears nothing on the face of the 
CCIA Agreement to alter the application of that Convention to COMESA 
Awards. More pressing is the issue whether the national law of the Member 
State recognises and applies the New York Convention.73
As to the roster of arbitrators, the COMESA Secretariat shall maintain such a 
roster of “qualified arbitrators from which parties to an arbitration under this 
Agreement may select arbitrators.”
 
74
                                                                                                                            
immunity from execution of the state concerned. The ICSID Convention provided an 
autonomous and simple system of recognition which excluded domestic rules concerning 
recognition of foreign awards. The Award in SOABI v Senegal is reproduced in 6 ICSID Rev-
FILJ 125 (1991). 
 This follows ICSID practice where a 
panel of suitably qualified arbitrators is also established. Again much is left 
open, such as the composition of arbitral tribunals the types of qualifications 
required of a member of the roster and the procedures for appointment of 
72 See for example AIG Capital Partners Inc and another v Republic of Kazakhstan 
(National Bank of Kazakhstan intervening) [2005] EWHC 2239 (Comm) [2006] 1 All ER 
284 (QBD) where it was held that the property of a state’s central bank or monetary 
authority was subject to state immunity under s.14(4) of the State Immunity Act 1978 and 
so could not be used to satisfy an ICSID award, even if such property was being held by 
third parties on behalf of the central bank or monetary authority.   
73 See further Asouzu above n.22 who notes at 208 that relatively few African countries 
have adopted the New York Convention. As of the time of writing (June 2008) of the 
COMESA Member States (see n.1 above) only Djibouti, Egypt, Kenya, Madagascar, 
Mauritius, Zambia and Zimbabwe had ratified the New York Convention see 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html  . 
74 CCIA Agreement above n.3 Article 30 
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individual tribunals. Other IIAs have more detailed provisions on this 
issue.75
  
 
Finally as regards the governing law, by Article 31 of the CCIA Agreement: 
 
“When a claim is submitted to an arbitral tribunal, it shall be decided 
in accordance with this Agreement, the COMESA Treaty, national 
law of the host state, and the general principles of international law.” 
 
The choice of governing law has been a contentious issue in investor-state 
arbitration. Normally the law of the host country is the law applicable to an 
investment contract between the investor and host state. However, this may 
not preclude all application of international law. Indeed, in interpreting 
Article 42 of the ICSID Convention, ICSID tribunals have consistently held 
that national law will apply only to the extent that it is consistent with 
general principles of international law.76 For example, it would not be open 
to the host state to exclude the international law relating to expropriation, as 
embodied in a BIT, by reference to an inconsistent national law.77 More 
recently, the ad hoc Annulment Committee in the case of Wena Hotels v Egypt 
went a step further and held that, in an appropriate case, a tribunal could apply 
the law of the BIT, to the exclusion of national law, under the terms of Article 
42(1) in the absence of agreement as to the proper law between the parties.78
 
  
The CCIA Agreement appears also to use international law as a corrective 
standard. Though there is a hierarchy of norms working down from the 
                                                 
75 See for example the US-Rwanda BIT above n.59 Article 27 Canada Model FIPA above 
n.57 Article 29-31. 
76 ICSID Convention above n.35 Article 42(1): “The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in 
accordance with such rules of law as may be agreed by the parties.  In the absence of such 
agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the law of the Contracting State party to the dispute 
(including its rules of the Conflict of Laws) and such rules of international law as may be 
applicable.” See Amco Asia v Indonesia resubmitted case 89 ILR 580 at 594 para.40 (1992). 
77 See Compania del Desarrollo de Santa Elena v Costa Rica ICSID Case No.ARB/96/1 
award of 17 February 2000, 15 ICSID Rev-FILJ 169 (2000) at para.64. 
78 ICSID Case No.ARB/98/4 Decision of the ad hoc Committee 28 January 2002, 41 ILM 
933 (2002) at paras.40-41.  
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specific provisions of the Agreement, the COMESA Treaty, and national law 
to the general principles of international law, this cannot be read as somehow 
limiting international legal review of the other provisions. An international 
tribunal cannot accept a plea from the respondent state that provisions of its 
own law or deficiencies in that law are an answer to a claim against it for an 
alleged breach of international law.79 This principle was affirmed by the ICSID 
Tribunal in Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited v Arab 
Republic of Egypt,80
 
 and this approach is likely to inform the interpretation of 
Article 31 of the CCIA Agreement, subject to one further issue. Given that 
COMESA is creating a supranational legal order not unlike that of the 
European Union, it is arguable that international law can apply only to the 
extent that this serves to develop the supranational order. The two are not 
necessarily identical. Thus a COMESA tribunal might be fully entitled to 
depart from general international law where the express terms of the CCIA 
Agreement or of the COMESA Treaty diverge from this. On a procedural level 
this is unlikely to cause difficulties as a COMESA tribunal will be an 
international tribunal that must follow rules of international law in the conduct 
of its procedures.  
By contrast in relation to substantive protection of investor rights, the specific 
provisions of these Treaties, rather than the much contested international 
minimum standard of protection for aliens and their property, will be the 
correct guide for determining the scope of the rights and obligations of 
COMESA investors. This is especially so given the development orientation of 
the fundamental aims of COMESA, which may not be entirely compatible 
with the traditional concept of the international minimum standard, with its 
                                                 
79 By Article 27 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969: "A party may not invoke the 
provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty..." Similarly, by 
Article 3 of the International Law Commission Articles on State Responsibility 2001: “The 
characterization of an act of a State as internationally wrongful is governed by international 
law. Such characterization is not affected by the characterization of the same act as lawful by 
internal law” (ILC Report of 53rd Sess. ILC (2001) GAOR 56th Sess, Supp.10). 
80 Award on the Merits 20 May 1992: 32 ILM 933 (1993). 
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stress of the protection of investor rights.81
 
 This proposition is possibly 
controversial but it is hard to see how else Article 31 of the CCIA Agreement 
can be read, given the nature of the substantive rights of action that a 
COMESA investor might enjoy. They do not necessarily coincide with the 
international minimum standard, but rather create a COMESA standard of 
protection.  
(3) Substantive Rights of Action under the CCIA Agreement 
 
It has already been noted that investors can only bring claims in relation to 
an alleged infringement of their rights under Part Two of the CCIA 
Agreement. Part Two contains the main standards of protection found in 
most IIAs, though with some important adaptations that will be considered 
further below.82
                                                 
81 See COMESA Treaty above n.1 Article 6 which states: “The Member States, in pursuit 
of the aims and objectives stated in Article 3 of this Treaty, and in conformity with the 
Treaty for the Establishment of the African Economic Community signed at Abuja, Nigeria 
on 3rd June, 1991, agree to adhere to the following principles: 
 In particular, the fair and equitable treatment standard the 
non-discrimination provisions and the expropriation clause warrant closer 
attention. The other substantive provisions of Part Two, on the transfer of 
(a) equality and inter-dependence of the Member States; 
(b) solidarity and collective self-reliance among the Member States; 
(c) inter-State co-operation, harmonisation of policies and integration of programmes 
among the Member States; 
(d) non-aggression between the Member States; 
(e) recognition, promotion and protection of human and peoples' rights in accordance with 
the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights; 
(f) accountability, economic justice and popular participation in development; 
(g) the recognition and observance of the rule of law; 
(h) the promotion and sustenance of a democratic system of governance in each Member 
State; 
(i) the maintenance of regional peace and stability through the promotion and strengthening 
of good neighbourliness; and 
(j) the peaceful settlement of disputes among the Member States, the active cooperation 
between neighbouring countries and the promotion of a peaceful environment as a pre-
requisite for their economic development.” 
On the controversy surrounding the international minimum standard of treatment see 
Charles Lipson Standing Guard: Protecting Foreign Capital in the Nineteenth and 
Twentieth Centuries (University of California Press, 1985). See too for a statement by the 
International Court of Justice expressing concern over this issue Case Concerning The 
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company above n.41 at paras.89-90.  
82 They are: fair and equitable treatment (Article 14), transfer of assets (Article 15), 
movement of labour (Article 16), national treatment (Article 17), most favoured national 
treatment (Article 19), expropriation (Article 20), compensation for losses (Article 21). 
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assets, movement of labour and, compensation for losses, raise no 
significant new issues. Their formulations conform to standard IIA practice 
and need not be further discussed here. The protection of Part Two extends 
only to investments of COMESA investors that have been duly registered 
with the relevant investment authority in the host country and which have 
been made either before or after entry into force of the CCIA Agreement.83 
It covers only disputes involving claims that have arisen since the entry into 
force of the Agreement.84
 
 Thus the CCIA Agreement has no retroactive 
force and claims arising before its entry into force will have to be dealt with 
by other means. 
Turning to the substantive rights, the right to fair and equitable treatment 
has a distinctive formulation that introduces a degree of judicial review of 
state administrative action. According to Article 14 (1) of the CCIA 
Agreement, “[f]air and equitable treatment includes the obligation not to 
deny justice in criminal, civil, or administrative adjudicatory proceedings in 
accordance with the principle of due process embodied in the principal legal 
systems of the world.” By Article 14 (2) this is said to prescribe, “the 
customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the 
minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to covered investments and 
does not require treatment in addition to or beyond what is required by that 
standard.” The final sentence of Article 14 (2) is a direct reference to a 
controversy that arose under the fair and equitable treatment standard in the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In the NAFTA 
arbitration Pope and Talbot v Canada the tribunal asserted that the fair and 
equitable treatment standard is “additive” to the international minimum 
standard.85
                                                 
83 CCIA Agreement above n.3 Article 12 (1) and (2). 
 On the other hand, the NAFTA Free Trade Commission issued a 
Note of Interpretation on 31 July 2001 which rejected any notion that 
Article 1105 of NAFTA contained any elements that were “additive” to the 
84 Ibid Article 12 (3). 
85 See Pope and Talbot v Canada Award on the Merits of Phase 2, 10 April 2001 at 
para.110 available on www.naftacliams.com. 
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international minimum standard.86
 
 The CCIA Agreement affirms the view 
that the fair and equitable treatment standard can be equated with the 
international minimum standard. However Article 14 (3) continues: 
“For greater certainty, Member States understand that different 
Member 
States have different forms of administrative, legislative and judicial 
systems and that Member States at different levels of development 
may not achieve the same standards at the same time. Paragraphs 1 
and 2 of this Article do not establish a single international standard 
in this context.” 
 
This is a departure from the traditional notion of the international minimum 
standard as an absolute standard of treatment and introduces a degree of 
flexibility in its interpretation based on the level of development of the 
respondent country. In this regard Article 14 appears to curtail significantly 
the protection afforded to an investor in relation to maladministration as it 
provides a novel defence, unknown in general international law, to the effect 
that the host country can plead its level of development as an explanation 
for poor administrative practices. This is not an approach that will find 
favour with investors, but it is an understandable attempt to curtail 
unreasonable claims.  
 
Indeed there is some arbitral case-law which suggests that the specific 
conditions in the host country are a factor that tribunals can taken into 
account when assessing whether a BIT has been infringed. Thus, the 
tribunal, in the CMS Case held that account should be taken of the effect of 
abnormal conditions, prompted by the economic crisis in Argentina, in 
                                                 
86 The Note of interpretation was considered to be mandatory by the Tribunal sitting on the 
damages award in the Pope and Talbot Case: see Pope and Talbot v Canada award in 
respect of damages, 31 May 2002, available on www.naftaclaims.com or 41 ILM 1347 
(2002). This was confirmed in Loewen v United States ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/98/3 
award of 26 June 2003: 42 ILM 811 (2003) at para.128.  
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assessing the scope of protection afforded to the investor by an investment 
treaty.87
 
 It continued: 
“The crisis had in itself a severe impact upon the Claimant’s 
business, but this aspect must to some extent be attributed to the 
business risk the Claimant took on when investing in Argentina, this 
being particularly the case as it related to decrease in demand. Such 
effects cannot be ignored as if business had continued as usual. 
Otherwise both parties would not be sharing some of the costs of the 
crisis in a reasonable manner and the decision could eventually 
amount to an insurance policy against business risk, and outcome 
that, as the Respondent has rightly argued, would not be justified.”88
 
   
Such concerns may be relevant in special cases, such as transitional 
economies, economies in crisis, and, possibly, highly underdeveloped 
countries or failing states. However, the actual condition of the host country 
cannot be used as an excuse for bad governance where the host country is 
able to offer high standards of administrative action but fails to do so. It may 
be rather too easy for a host country to use this argument in justifying its 
own regulatory shortcomings. Thus some limits need to be developed to this 
argument. So far the existing case law remains relatively unclear.89
 
   
Turning to national treatment, this will only be available for COMESA 
investors as of right by 2010. Up until then the Member States need only 
make “every effort” to extend the standard to such investors.90
                                                 
87 CMS v Argentina above n.11 at para.244. 
 Thus, under 
the terms of the CCIA Agreement, it would appear that no claim based on 
88 Ibid. para.248. 
89 See further Nick Gallus “The Influence of the Host State’s Level of Development on 
International Investment Treaty Standards of Protection” 6 JWIT 711 (2005). Gallus notes 
that there has been a significant number of BIT based ICSID cases in which the developing 
host country’s level of development was not taken into account. However in AMT v Zaire 
(ICSID Case No. ARB /93/1 award of 21 February 1997: 36 ILM 1531 (1997)) the issue 
was relevant to the determination of compensation, where the claimant was found to have 
been aware of local conditions (at paras. 7.14-7.15). 
90 CCIA Agreement  above n.3 Article 3 (b) (i). 
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national treatment can be brought until 2010 as the respondent host country 
could defend the claim on the basis that it is not obliged to provide national 
treatment until that time. Once available, national treatment will cover both 
pre-entry and post entry treatment and will be subject to a comprehensive 
“like circumstances” test.91
 
 In addition, the national treatment provision will 
be subject to a negative list of exceptions and qualifications under Article 18 
of the CCIA Agreement.  
By contrast most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment is immediately 
available. It too extends to pre and post entry treatment and is subject to the 
same “like circumstances” test as national treatment. It is subject to the 
common exceptions relating to regional integration agreements and taxation 
conventions that are found in most MFN provisions in IIAs.92
 
 MFN shall not 
apply to investment agreements entered into by Member States with non-
Member States prior to the entry into force of the CCIA Agreement. This 
ensures that COMESA investors will be unable to use the MFN clause to 
extend the operation of agreements with non-COMESA countries into the 
CCIA Agreement. The latter is the sole basis of rights for COMESA 
investors in the region and it cannot be supplemented by rights from other 
investment treaties concluded with non-Member States. 
The expropriation provision in Article 20 is worded so as to protect 
legitimate regulatory actions of the host country from challenge under the 
dispute settlement provisions.93
                                                 
91 See ibid Article 17. 
 Thus compulsory intellectual property 
licences or the revocation, limitation or creation of intellectual property 
92 Ibid Article 19. 
93 Ibid Article 20. See too Article 23(3) which provides for a special procedure in relation to 
claims for expropriation based on a tax measure: “An investor that seeks to invoke Article 
20 with respect to a taxation measure must refer to the Secretary General of the COMESA 
at the time that it gives its notice of intention to arbitrate under Article 28 the issue of 
whether that taxation measure involves an expropriation. The Secretary General shall ask 
the competent authorities of the host state and home state whether they do not agree to 
consider the issue or, having agreed to consider it, fail to agree that the measure is not an 
expropriation within a period of six months of such referral, in which case the investor may 
submit its claim to arbitration, if the other conditions of Article 28 have been fulfilled as 
well. 
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rights, are outside its protection to the extent that such measures are 
consistent with applicable international agreements on intellectual 
property.94 In addition, a measure of general application shall not be 
considered an expropriation of a debt security or loan solely on the ground 
that the measure imposes costs on the debtor that cause it to default on the 
debt.95
 
 On a more general level, Article 20 (8) states: 
“Consistent with the right of states to regulate and the customary 
international law principles on police powers, bona fide regulatory 
measures taken by a Member State that are designed and applied to 
protect or enhance legitimate public welfare objectives, such as 
public health, safety and the environment, shall not constitute an 
indirect expropriation under this Article.” 
 
This provision is an important restatement of the limits of investor 
protection under the law relating to expropriation. Recently concern has 
been expressed that, with the extension of IIA provisions on expropriation 
to indirect or regulatory takings, legitimate exercises of regulatory power 
taken for essential policy reasons might fall foul of investor claims, thereby 
weakening the ability of the host state to regulate and leading to “regulatory 
chill”.96 Other more recent IIAs have also included provisions distinguishing 
between legitimate regulation and a regulatory taking and the CCIA 
Agreement is adding to this trend.97
                                                 
94 Ibid Article 20 (6). 
 One notable issue arising here is 
whether the legitimacy of the measure in question will be considered in the 
light of its proportionality to the regulatory aim being pursued. Such an 
95 Ibid Article 20 (7). 
96 See further Muchlinski above n.39 at 587-96. 
97 See for example the US-Rwanda BIT above n.59 Article 6 and Annexes A and B. In 
Annex B para.4 (b): “Except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions 
by a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, 
such as public health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect 
expropriations.” See too Canadian FIPA above n.57 Article 13 and Annex B(13) (1) (c): 
“Except in rare circumstances, such as when a measure or series of measures are so severe 
in the light of their purpose that they cannot be reasonably viewed as having been adopted 
and applied in good faith, non-discriminatory measures of a Party that are designed and 
applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as health, safety and the 
environment, do not constitute indirect expropriation.” 
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approach is taken in the Canadian FIPA.98
 
 It remains to be seen if COMESA 
tribunals might apply a similar principle, or whether they will emphasise the 
right to regulate and give to the host country a large measure of discretion in 
interfering with investor rights. Finally Article 20 (9) requires that the host 
country gives to the investor a right to judicial or administrative review of 
any act of expropriation and valuation of compensation under national law. 
Such review will take into account the requirements of Article 20. This is 
not an exhaustion of local remedies requirement as the provision does not 
mandate the use of such procedures prior to making a claim under Article 28 
of the CCIA Agreement.  
Article 22 of the CCIA Agreement adds a general exceptions clause which 
serves to reinforce the host states right to regulate in the areas listed 
provided that, “such measures are not applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
investors where like conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on 
investment flows.”99
                                                 
98 See previous note. 
 This approach follows the structure of Article XX of 
the GATT and introduces a “chapeau” outlining a test of the legitimacy of a 
measure in relation to the aims of the Agreement. It applies an analogy with 
the GATT Agreement, which refers to arbitrary and unjustifiable 
99 CCIA Agreement above n.3 Article 22(1). Article 22 goes on to say that, “nothing in this 
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any Member State 
of measures: 
(a) designed and applied to protect national security and public morals; 
(b) designed and applied to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
(c) designed and applied to protect the environment; or 
(d) any other measures as may from time to time be determined by a Member State, subject 
to approval by the CCIA Committee. 
2. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a Member State from adopting, 
maintaining or enforcing any measure that it considers appropriate to ensure that 
investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to the principles 
outlined in sub-paragraphs 1(a) to (c) above. 
3. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to: 
(a) preclude a Member State from applying measures that it considers necessary for the 
fulfillment of its obligations under the United Nations Charter with respect to the 
maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or the protection of its own 
essential security interests; or 
(b) require a Member State to furnish or allow access to any information the disclosure of 
which it determines to be contrary to its essential security interests. 
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discrimination and disguised restrictions on trade, by referring to disguised 
restrictions on investment.100 Under the GATT this has been interpreted as 
introducing a “least trade restrictive” test for regulatory measures requiring 
the protection of Article XX.101
 
 A similar approach based on a “least 
investment restrictive” test could also be developed by COMESA tribunals. 
It would involve examining whether the policy aim in question could have 
been achieved with less interference to the investors rights or to their 
investment.  
Finally, Articles 24 and 25 of the CCIA Agreement provide procedures 
involving the CCIA Committee in relation, respectively, to emergency 
safeguard measures necessitated by threats of serious injury to the economy 
of a Member State caused by economic liberalisation and temporary balance 
of payments measures.102 Again the content of these provisions owe more to 
the GATT than to other IIAs, which do not in general contain such 
provisions. In relation to investor-state disputes they provide a means of 
dispute avoidance as they allow for the Committee to act as an adjudicator 
of the conformity of host state measures with the CCIA Agreement, by 
reason of the requirement of notification of the measures to the Committee 
on the part of the Member State undertaking them. This can prevent the 
alternative situation where the host Member State passes measures 
unilaterally and, should the measures cause loss to the investor, the latter 
will bring a claim. This occurred in relation to disputes concerning 
Argentina’s emergency measures in response the peso crisis in 2000-2001 
resulting in a large number of BIT based arbitrations.103
                                                 
100 See too for a similar formulation Canada FIPA above n.57 Article 10. 
 It is not entirely 
clear whether decisions made under Articles 24 and 25 can form the basis of 
a claim by the investor. Although these provisions are located in Part Two 
of the CCIA Agreement, it appears that investors cannot challenge the 
determination of the CCIA Committee as its powers of decision are granted 
101 See United States- Standards for Reformulated Gasoline and Conventional Gasoline 
WTO Appellate Body adopted 20 May 1996 WT/DS2/AB/R at 22-29. 
102 CCIA Agreement above n.3 Articles 24 and 25. 
103 On which see Burke-White and Von Staden n.14 above. 
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by Article 7 (2) (b) in Part One of the CCIA Agreement and, as noted 
earlier, investors are specifically excluded from making claims concerning 
issues arising out of Part One. However private sector representatives can be 
present at CCIA Committee meetings as ex officio members and to that 
extent can have an input.   
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper has examined the new investor-state dispute settlement 
provisions of the CCIA Agreement. This is a significant departure in IIA 
practice as it represents a developing country arrangement and not one 
between a developed and developing country, as is usual in relation to the 
majority of BITs. Therefore it is a significant example of what developing 
countries in Africa see as the proper approach to this field of dispute 
settlement. In this it should act as a counter-example to the developed 
country dominated models of IIAs and to offer a new departure for analysis 
of how future IIAs should be structured. That said it also reflects certain 
new developments taken in US and Canadian Model BITs in particular. This 
may indicate the gradual emergence of a new international consensus about 
the balance of rights and obligations on the part of the host country in IIAs, 
giving to it more flexibility in carrying out legitimate regulatory action. 
Where the CCIA Agreement goes further, though, is in the introduction of 
the concept of investor obligations as a balance against host country 
obligations. This is still a very tentative development and it is rather limited 
compared to certain NGO initiatives in this field.104
                                                 
104 See for example the Canadian based International Institute for Sustainable Development 
(IISD) IISD Model International Agreement on Investment for Sustainable Development 
Negotiators Handbook (April 2005 revised April 2006) 
 However it does 
represent a new departure in IIA practice and one which may develop more 
fully over time.  What the CCIA Agreement does not do is to provide 
extensive and detailed procedural provisions on investor-state dispute 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/investment_model_int_handbook.pdf . The Model Agreement 
is reproduced in 20 ICSID Rev-FILJ 91 (2005) and see too Howard Mann “Introductory 
Note” ibid. 84.   
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settlement such as appear in the US and Canadian Models. In addition many 
important issues are left unaddressed, such as the consolidation of multiple 
claims or appellate review. However, this should not detract from the fact 
that the CCIA Agreement offers a great deal of food for thought about the 
further evolution of investor-state dispute settlement issues in future 
generations of IIAs.    
 
 
 
 
   
